"Lebanon is looking into the abyss," opined one commentator, while another concluded that the country probably entered into a period of "controlled chaos" because Parliament failed to meet and elect a new head of state before November 24.
While my previous analyses anticipated a quick resolution - on a compromise candidate like Army Commander General Michel Suleiman - this has not happened. Nevertheless, and ironically, everyday without an elected leader translates into a significant enhancement for the last remaining legitimising institution in the country - the army.
Lebanon might still face catastrophe, although chances are excellent that current divisions, nurtured by gigantic French errors, will boost the military's self-confidence.
The army, especially at the rank and file level, is enjoying its best morale in decades. Simply put, each soldier fully understands that he is the ultimate guarantor of Lebanese sovereignty, with immeasurable benefits for society at large.
Moreover, each soldier is amply aware that the vast majority of Lebanese, both Christian and Muslim, stand with him as an individual ready to defend the country and its independence.
In fact, it seems that each and every soldier is looking up to the army leadership, to fulfil a governance mandate based on law and order. This cannot but augur well for independent Lebanon.
One must confess that it would have been difficult to write the previous four sentences a few years or even a few months ago. Nevertheless, Beirut now faces a conundrum: will its zu'ama accept to leave the presidency vacant and for how long?
To be sure, the French are not the only ones who fell into the Syrian trap; Paris dragged along Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Butros Sfeir by insisting that he deliver a list of potential candidates.
Against his better judgment, Sfeir provided such a list after he was given ironclad guarantees that the Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri would convene a session where elections could be held. Little did French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner realise that Berri is not master of his own decisions.
In contrast, the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora successfully dismissed the outgoing president's "emergency measures", by asserting the Cabinet's constitutional mandate to fill a political vacuum.
Remarkably, and while opposition forces considered the Siniora government illegitimate, no one, neither Hezbollah, nor Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, nor Speaker Berri's Amal Movement, nor the slew of minor actors who pullulate the airwaves with partisan rhetoric, can rise against the government now that the army and internal security forces are committed to it.
In other words, the opposition cannot pull off a coup d'état against the Siniora government because the army is solidly unified, and is standing with the government. In fact, were the opposition foolish enough to attempt a sectarian division of the military, chances are excellent that such a move will severely backfire on it.
Opportunity
Herein lies an opportunity for Suleiman to demonstrate his impeccable credentials. First, to accept all United Nations Security Council resolutions, from 1559 to 1701.
Second, while Beirut welcomed Washington's unparalleled and long overdue dedication to strengthen its "strategic alliance" with the Lebanese Army, Suleiman must resist the temptation to use the military to crush the resistance.
On the contrary, the army must build on the broad support it now enjoys from all Lebanese communities, regardless of religious affiliation, by gradually absorbing Hezbollah troops and equipment.
To his credit, Suleiman understands that Shiite Lebanese in the opposition are Lebanese citizens first, and that they will have to play a positive role in the democratic experiment that is Lebanon.
The army's pro-resistance sympathies cannot and should not be reversed but re-channelled to serve the country - not Damascus or Teheran or Paris or Washington. That is how one structures a nation.
Suleiman is also aware that a potential US-Syrian deal cannot be excluded in which Lebanon will pay the ultimate price and must resist the temptation to align the army with outsiders.
In short, the army can lead by redefining the role of the resistance, while forging correct ties with all protagonists that will, unfortunately, continue to meddle in internal Lebanese affairs.
Since Lebanon operates under a sectarian system, its politics prevented the adoption of a supra-national identity in the past, with each community preferring to maintain a semblance of national cohesion.
Yet, because the 1989 Taif Accord was not fully implemented, outside interference became a favourite sport and, sadly, few Lebanese erected nationalistic barriers to prevent such meddling.
Who can now eliminate the considerable animosities that exist between Maronites and Shiites, or those mushrooming between Sunnis and Shiites, or even those that are spurting within the Maronite community itself?
Given these nuances, the Lebanese Parliament cannot elect a new president as long as the opposition refuses to vote, and the majority will not acquiesce to the opposition's dictat.
Short of a genuine election, which requires at least two candidates to contest a ballot, the zu'ama can either move to amend the constitution - and appoint/elect Suleiman - or face several months when the presidency will remain vacant.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.
