The European Union has dismissed it as farce while the US describes it as a travesty. And, yet, last Friday's parliamentary election in Iran provides an insight into the balance of power within the establishment in Tehran.
To judge elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran by standards observed in the 100 or so countries described by Freedom House as "democratic" would be to miss the point. It would be equally wrong to put the Iranian elections in the same category as "voting spectacles" in Cuba and North Korea.
The key question in elections in the Islamic Republic concerns the voter turnout.
Although some numbers can be inflated, especially in the provinces, it is not always easy to deceive the public on the subject. People have eyes and see how many people show up at polling stations.
The authorities claim a 60 per cent turnout last Friday. However, Western journalists covering the election report a much lower turnout. This is confirmed by anecdotal evidence from several cities, including Tehran, Ahvaz, Isfahan and Zahedan where turnout appeared unusually low.
But even if the figure given by the government is correct, the turnout was 20 per cent lower than the presidential election in 2005, and one of the lowest in the history of elections in Iran.
Elections in the Islamic Republic resemble primaries held by political parties in the United States.
Voters are asked to choose among pre-selected candidates vetted and approved by the authorities. The system is based on the principle that, since all candidates are loyal to the "Supreme Guide" and sworn to obeying him, it would make no difference which ones win.
In practice, however, the choices offered by the regime, and those made by the electorate, can and at times do make a difference.
Often, the choice offered by the regime indicates its current needs and anxieties.
In the first elections in 1980 and 1984, the choices offered reflected the regime's need to consolidate itself around a hard core of mullahs with figures from the bazaar providing an interface with the rest of society.
In the elections that followed the end of the war with Iraq in 1988, the regime tried to attract the middle classes by fielding some academics and businessmen as candidates along with the inevitable mullahs.
The trend continued in the 1990s with the regime seeking to maintain a popular base by fielding candidates with some personal local following.
Last Friday's election reflected two facts.
The first is the regime's increasing feeling of insecurity.
Despite President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's defiant posture, the Khomeinist establishment still fears military action by the United States or Israel or both.
Iran sees itself surrounded by US military power present in 12 of Iran's 15 neighbouring countries.
That feeling of insecurity is intensified by unrest in provinces where elements within ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs and Turkmens are showing early signs of revolt against the central government.
The elections show that the regime regards security as its most urgent need. This has enabled the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to dominate the electoral process and fill the future Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) with its retired or active officers.
The latest results indicate that the IRGC could end up with some 70 per cent of the seats in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis).
The IRGC fielded candidates in three factions.
The largest of these looks to Ahmadinejad as its standard-bearer. Having entered the race under the label of "Fundamentalists", the pro-Ahmadinejad faction is likely to end up with 100 out of the 290 seats.
The second faction, led by Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, an IRGC general, may end up with 30 seats.
A third faction, sponsored by former IRGC Commander General Mohsen Rezai and backed by former negotiator on the nuclear issue Ali Larijani is slated to win 20.
At least half of the 40 men elected as independents are also former or active members of the IRGC or security services linked to it, and likely to side with their fellow military on crucial issues.
Establishing each faction's exact strength is rendered difficult by the fact that some candidates were present on several lists at the same time.
Some 30 seats are likely to go to elements close to former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. These describe themselves as "reformists" and promise to form the core of opposition to Ahmadinejad in the Majlis.
In the next Majlis, the number of members with IRGC backgrounds will be twice larger than that of mullahs.
Using elections as a means of purging the regime, the IRGC has dislodged many elements linked with the revolution since the late 1970s.
Denied seats
Most of the prominent mullahs who led the revolution are gone along with men who made a name by seizing US diplomats hostage in 1979. Even members of the Khomeini clan, including the ayatollah's close blood relations, were denied seats in the Majlis.
The Islamic Republic has gone the way of many other Third World regimes by shedding most of its early populist illusions and increasingly relying on the military and security services. Like other revolutions in history, the Khomeinist revolution has sold its soul to the military in the hope of ensuring its own security.
The second fact highlighted by the elections is that the European Union policy of encouraging a change of behaviour in the Islamic Republic, a policy recently also evoked by the Bush administration, has had the opposite effect.
Rather than indicating a desire to change behaviour on key issues, including Tehran's drive for achieving mastery of a full nuclear cycle, Iran has produced the most radical Majlis in its history.
Last year the Bush administration, backed by the US Congress, put the IRGC on the list of international terrorist organisations.
Later, the United Nations Security Council named several IRGC commanders as personae non grata throughout the world. Banks and businesses belonging to IRGC have had their assets frozen in some 40 countries, including most EU members and the United States.
And, yet, the message from Tehran is clear: If you wish to deal with the Islamic Republic, you have to deal with the IRGC. Although no Iranian Bonaparte has emerged yet, it is clear that the military cap is replacing the turban at the summit of Tehran politics.
Amir Taheri is an Iranian writer based in Europe.
