I was talking to Brigadier General Alaa Hashem from the Iraqi Minister of Interior's office when the orders were issued. He said in a hush voice: "We are heading to Basra with the big man".
I imagined the "big man" to be Jawad Al Boulani, his boss: the Iraqi Minister of Interior, but it turned out to be the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki. It appears that for the first time Al Maliki is trying to gain control of an exploding situation in Iraq.
At first, Iraq's National Guards, the police and the Rapid Intervention Forces headed towards the hot spot, without the intervention of American or British armed forces.
Not that the fighting itself is anything to be glad about, for no matter who is clashing, it is the innocent people that are greatly affected when fighting breaks out in their neighbourhoods, but Al Maliki's new attitude was a relief.
The Iraqi forces, led by Al Maliki are standing their ground and fighting the way they learnt how to fight. This time, sadly, Iran is pulling the strings and militia leaders in Al Mahdi army are not abiding by Moqtada Al Sadr's orders.
True, the fiery religious leader has a loyal following in Baghdad's Sadr City and other enclaves, thanks to his late father's legacy, but his Mahdi militia and the recently extended ceasefire are no match for Iranian interference. Al Sadr who is believed to be in Qom now, is involved in a very complicated relationship with the Iranians. The Iranians provide funding and support for the Mahdi militia and they try to keep Al Sadr, unsuccessfully, under their control. However, not all Al Mahdi leaders listen to Moqtada.
Iran encourages dissension within the Mahdi militia by backing hardliners, who oppose Al Sadr and engage in operations against the US occupation. They also expose Iraqis to all sorts of pressures, taking bribes and acting like an authority all by themselves. Needless to say, Iraqis fear them more than the Americans and the Iraqi government.
Violence in Basra
The violence in Basra is a new act all together. While the Americans are unaccustomed to seeing this kind of fighting, few Iraqis had doubts that it would happen one day.
Back in Saddam's days, the only time the Shiites revolted, after the 1991 Shiite uprising against the Baath regime, took place after the assassination of Moqtada Al Sadr's father, the late Mohammad Al Sadr.
After Saddam was ousted in 2003, Al Sadr movement was put together instantly, although they never existed as a united or organised front before. The Iraqi police force and national guards of today are made up of Al Sadr loyalists, most of them members of the Al Mahdi militia.
So here we have Al Maliki, using forces that have a very soft spot for the enemy they are ordered to fight.
What we see today is not Sunni versus Shiites fighting, this is not civil war, this is not sectarian violence, its intra-Shiite politics for control of Al Maliki's government, between Al Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council militias (Badr Brigades).
Al Maliki is trying to hold together his political alliance, which includes the political wings of the militias that are fighting amongst themselves, and which he is fighting as well.
If this alliance breaks, the government's ship will sink, parliament will break down and needless to say, Al Sadr's truce will end as well.
This is Al Maliki's chance to show his worth. If he plays the politics right and tries to reach a compromise with the force - Al Sadrist movement -which backed him in the elections then he and Iraq will survive this crisis.
Today, Iraq is sitting on top of a very active volcano, waiting and praying that the situation will not deteriorate into another Lebanon of the 1980s. As one American analyst said: "We're looking at a situation that will be akin to Lebanon in the 1980s, with vicious, well-armed militia proxy wars where all the factions are supported by one foreign sponsor or another. But this will be Lebanon on steroids."
