For the past three weeks the Iraqi city of Basra has been turned into a battle ground between the forces of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki and Moqtada Al Sadr's militia - the Mahdi Army.

Clashes spread quickly to include the southern cities of Hillah, Kut, Karbala, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, and Amarah; in addition to the Sadr city in Baghdad.

Fighting broke out 24 hours after an unscheduled visit to Baghdad by the US Vice-President Dick Cheney. Al Maliki emerged from the meeting with Cheney with an ultimatum to the Mahdi Army that it should lay down its arms or face dire consequences.

Within hours Al Maliki was leading a major Iraqi force to dislodge the Mahdi Army and regain control over Basra. The performance of the government's forces was so poor that scores of soldiers have deserted whereas others joined the Sadr movement, causing huge embarrassment for the prime minister.

For many analysts, the break up of the alliance between Al Maliki's Dawa Party and the Al Sadr movement was somehow bewildering, given that Al Maliki has obtained the prime minister's office largely because Al Sadr used the votes of his bloc to give him the position.

Al Maliki snatched the post from the candidate of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), led by Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, Al Sadr's main Shiite rival. Most analysts believe, however, that Al Maliki's decision to break with Al Sadr has less to do with US pressure to disarm the Al Mahdi Army, the major Shiite resistance to the occupation.

Rather, it was largely driven by the fear that the Al Sadr movement has grown so strong that it threatens to win the local and provincial elections at the end of this year and the national elections in 2009, sidelining both Al Maliki and Al Hakim.

Mass support

Virtually all experts agree that the Al Sadr movement probably has more mass support among Shiites than the combination of Dawa and the SIIC. It is almost a certainty that Al Sadr would win in Baghdad and the south in any future elections.

It is hence reasonable to argue that the fighting that began on March 25 in Basra has been directed largely against Al Sadr precisely because he was becoming more of a threat to Dawa and the SIIC leaders, who got into power aboard US tanks and not because of real popular support.

Al Maliki claimed that his real objective from confronting the Al Sadr movement was to "disarm militias and consolidate the state monopoly on the use of force". Yet, he seems to have been careful to avoid provoking the other Shiite parties in ways that might lead to a violent reaction.

Most important, perhaps, he seems to condone the influence of the SIIC's militia, the Badr Organisation, which controls some elements of the Iraqi Army, and substantial elements of the police at the national and provincial level.

Al Maliki seems also be trying to build his own militia to counteract the influence of the other Shiite factions. He has in fact managed to win personal loyalty among supporters of the Al Fadhila Party, which split from Al Sadr, and played an important role in controlling the government in Basra in the latest round of fighting.

Moreover, according to Al Hayat, the London-based Arab daily, Al Maliki has tried to buy loyalty among tribal leaders in Basra, using central government funds to create what could become elements of a local security force under his direct control.

Indeed, the Mahdi army has committed heinous crimes against the Sunni population of the country. These crimes can even be dubbed as crimes against humanity. Yet, this is the last thing that might trouble Al Maliki and his SIIC ally.

Moreover, the Al Maliki's war on the Al Sadr movement has absolutely nothing to do with a proclaimed national agenda to consolidate the power of the Iraqi state, disband militias and establish order and security.

It is rather a clear attempt to marginalise the political threat of the most popular Shiite movement in Iraq. It is an intra-Shiite conflict to decide the identity of Iraq's rulers in the post-occupation era.

 

Dr Marwan Kabalan is a lecturer in media and international relations, Faculty of Political Science and Media, Damascus University, Syria.