In April 2006, and in a speech resonated throughout Lebanon and the Arab world, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah invited the Americans to disarm his group if they wanted to implement UN Resolution 1559. The Bush administration accepted the invitation and passed it to Israel. Israel waited for the nearest opportunity and answered Nasrallah's invitation. For 33 days, Israel's air force wrecked havoc across Lebanon, killing civilians, displacing villagers and destroying the infrastructure which Lebanon spent years rebuilding.
Israel's military operation aimed at putting immense pressure on Hezbollah to disarm, release two captured Israeli soldiers and force the Lebanese government to send the army to the south to safeguard Israel's northern borders.
Taking advantage of the total overlap between its own interests and those of the US, Israel sought to remove Hezbollah because it represented a military and ideological threat. It wanted to avenge the defeat of 2000 when it was forced by Hezbollah to withdraw from South Lebanon without conditions. It wanted to restore its lost pride when Hezbollah succeeded in kidnapping two soldiers from the Israeli side of the borders with Lebanon. The US's major objective, on the other hand, was to trim Iran's influence in the region by breaking the back of the Lebanese Islamic movement.
For most of the 33-day war, Israel enjoyed the widest international support in any conflict with the Arab world. Yet, its onslaught against Lebanon produced the opposite effect. Hezbollah dealt the Israeli army a painful blow, unmatched in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The stature of Hezbollah and the popularity of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, rose in the Arab and the Islamic world in an unprecedented way. Lebanon overcame the brutality of the Israeli military machine and its national unity emerged intact.
In general, Lebanon was largely united behind both Hezbollah's military efforts to defend the country and the diplomatic efforts of its government. After the war, however, the country returned to normal politics and split through confessional fault lines galvanised by political and ideological differences.
Post-2006-war Lebanon is divided between two projects that reflect both internal dynamics and regional and international interests. The first is led by Lebanese Sunni bourgeoisie, revived and empowered by the late prime minister Rafik Hariri. It enjoys massive support from "moderate Sunni Arab states" and the West. Proponents of this project seek to re-establish a wounded merchant and cosmopolitan Lebanon.
The second project is composed mainly from Shiite Lebanese, with Hezbollah as its backbone. It enjoys the backing of Iran and empowered by Shiite revival across the Middle East. Proponents of this project consider Lebanon as a frontline in the fight against Israel and its Western patrons; mainly the US.
In many ways, the ongoing conflict in Lebanon between Hezbollah and the Sunni-led Lebanese government is a microcosm of a wider conflict between the US project for a new, more liberal Middle East and the radical, revolutionary project of Iran. Wittingly or unwittingly, this low-level local conflict has developed into a more bloody one as the US-Iran relations deteriorate further. This was abundantly clear last week when Hezbollah declared war against the Siniora government.
Clearly, Lebanon is caught today in the middle of a larger regional conflict wherein local Lebanese parties have effectively chosen to act as surrogate for the central powers in this struggle. This could plunge small Lebanon yet into another bloody civil war, something Israel could not accomplish during its latest brutal military campaign. Lebanon can be saved only when the different Lebanese parties realise sooner rather than later that the very existence of their own country depends on their acting as Lebanese first and foremost.
Dr Marwan Kabalan is a lecturer in Media and International Relations Faculty of Political Science and Media Damascus University Damascus, Syria.
