After nearly two weeks of ugly skirmishes which have claimed nearly 100 lives, the Lebanese government of Fouad Siniora has made important concessions to the opposition. These have opened the door for a national dialogue, aided by active mediation by the Arab League.
The opposition, led by Hezbollah, has responded positively and is shortly expected to restore access to Beirut's international airport. Yet the internal power struggle is largely unresolved and the country remains hostage to the wider contest for regional dominance between the United States and Israel on the one hand and Iran and Syria on the other.
Last week, the US President George W. Bush added fuel to the fire with a characteristically belligerent statement. "The international community," he declared, "will not allow the Iranian and Syrian regimes, via their proxies, to return Lebanon to foreign domination and control".
This from an American President who actively supported Israel's 33-day war against Lebanon in July 2006, and whose wanton destruction of Iraq has handed unprecedented influence to Iran, while releasing across the region the sectarian demons of Shiite and Sunni rivalry.
Lebanon is a tragic victim of American blunders, Israeli aggression and regional struggles. Its main hope for a return to calm lies in the enhanced role of the Lebanese army, whose role as arbiter of the internal conflicts appears to be accepted by all. The army has remained united and relatively neutral throughout the current crisis, and has vowed to disarm all those intent on continuing the fight.
The crisis erupted on May 7, when Siniora's US-backed government threatened to shut down Hezbollah's secret fibre optics communications network, a key command-and-control asset which allowed the movement to resist Israel's onslaught two years ago. The government also sacked Colonel Wafiq Shuquair, the officer in charge of security at Beirut airport, alleging that he was pro-Hezbollah.
The political motive behind these highly provocative actions may have been an attempt to drive a wedge between Hezbollah and its Christian allies, a group led by former army commander General Michel Aoun. In the event, the moves backfired badly.
Hezbollah denounced them as a "declaration of war". In a swift operation, it routed its Sunni opponents, occupied West Beirut, fief of the Sunni leader Sa'ad Hariri, and drove Druze leader Walid Junblatt's forces out of some key towns and villages in the Shuf - only to turn these areas promptly over to the Lebanese army.
Hezbollah thus demonstrated that it was by far the strongest of Lebanon's factions - a fact already well-known. At the same time, it also made clear that it had no intention of taking over the state.
Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, declared that the solution to the crisis lay in annulling the "illegitimate decisions" of the government - which the government has now agreed to do - and in accepting the invitation to hold a national dialogue, as proposed by Hezbollah's ally, Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament and head of the Amal movement. "We do not want a war with anyone," Nasrallah declared.
In the meantime, however, Hezbollah is maintaining its pressure to bring down the Siniora government by a campaign of "civil disobedience".
The crisis has had a number of important consequences, which together make a resolution still more difficult. The Sunnis have been humiliated. As Hariri has proved unable to protect them, some may be tempted to turn to extreme Islamist elements, known to lurk in Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps. These may resort to political assassinations or other acts of violence. The impetuous Junblatt has, in turn, suffered a serious loss of face. Another important result of the crisis has been to cement a de facto alliance between the Army and Hezbollah, which are united in resisting Israeli pressures and encroachments.
General Michel Sulaiman rose to command the Lebanese army under Syria's aegis, when its troops were stationed in Lebanon. He has a reputation as an honest and patriotic military man and is unlikely to become an instrument in the hands of Syria's opponents. But because he has stayed above the fray, he remains something of an unknown quantity. His political experience is limited and no one knows whom he might choose to advise him, if he were elected president.
The Army-Hezbollah entente is one of the paradoxes of the present situation, since the Army benefits from aid from the US. The hope is that, in a context of peace, Hezbollah's forces would merge into the national army. But so long as Israel remains threatening, Hezbollah intends to remain on a war footing and will not allow anyone to tamper with its defensive capability.
A third consequence of the crisis has been to deepen still further the confessional divide between Sunnis, Shiites and Christians. At present, the Christians, about 30 per cent of the population, are allotted 50 per cent of parliamentary seats, while the Sunnis and Shiites, each in turn about 30 per cent of the population - a Muslim total of well over 60 per cent if the small Druze community of about 6 per cent is added - have to make do with the remaining 50 per cent of parliamentary seats.
Over-representation
Ideally, the over-representation of the Christians in parliament would need to be corrected in any future reform - something the Christians will fight tooth and nail to prevent. Confessionalism has been the plague of Lebanon since its creation in 1920. It is widely agreed that it should be abolished altogether in favour of loyalty to the state by all Lebanese, whatever their religious affiliation. But this is a distant prospect.
Meanwhile, the Arab world's heavyweights, Saudi Arabia and Egypt - as well as a diplomatically active Gulf State like Qatar - are anxious to help Lebanon regain its equilibrium. They are backing the Arab League's mediation efforts and have sought to bring their own influence to bear on Lebanon's warring factions.
But they are hampered by their own ambivalent attitudes. While they have close ties to the US, they object to many of Bush's policies, notably his uncritical alignment on Israel and his incendiary denunciations of Iran and Syria. Saudi Arabia and Egypt worry about Iran's growing regional influence and its numerous interventions in Arab politics, notably in Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza.
They are suspicious of Syria's evident dependence on Iran. But they also recognise that Iran is a regional power with which they have to live.
They have accordingly resisted Bush's misguided efforts to mobilise them against Iran. The Arab Gulf states, in particular, trade briskly with Iran and are home to a large Iranian population. They do not want to isolate Iran or undermine its economy, as the US and Israel would like them to do.
It seems clear that greater understanding and confidence between Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the one hand and Iran and Syria on the other - free from US and Israeli interference - would do much to ease Lebanon's path to peace and security.
Patrick Seale is a commentator and author of several books on Middle East affairs.
