The Kuwaiti ruler, Shaikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, reappointed Prime Minister Shaikh Nasser Al Mohammad Al Sabah to form a new cabinet following last Saturday's parliamentary elections. While this was not surprising, can the state afford to ignore the results of its latest plebiscite?
With minor changes, the 12th National Assembly election results illustrated that the state was still very conservative, where the pace of change was slow.
Sunni Islamists, who won 21 of Parliament's 50 seats, emerged as a key bloc. The Islamic Salafi Alliance made significant gains as well, and Shiites secured five seats (for a net gain of one), which made this assembly one of the most traditionalist ever.
With 24 elected deputies, tribal constituencies emerged as the other critical bloc, although at least 18 were pre-qualified through illegal "primaries".
Interestingly, the overall composition of the 12th assembly retained its predecessor's features, despite a new electoral system that reduced the number of constituencies from 25 to 5.
In fact, attempts to clampdown on tribal "primaries" ended up having a marginal impact, because the overall outcome denied major changes, especially to help elect women.
Regrettably, and despite allegations that liberal groups confused electors, especially in the largely moderate third constituency, not a single of 27 women candidates gained a seat.
Although pundits anticipated that several would in fact secure places this time around, the state's conservative preferences asserted themselves.
Still, while women candidates needed to sharpen their grass-roots skills, and despite the 55 per cent ratio of female voters in the total eligible electorate [361,700], the results illustrated how steep the contest is.
Barely a day after election results were posted, several deputies offered a glimpse of what was in store.
Fahd Al Azimi, a tribal assemblyman, declared his intentions to grill interior minister Shaikh Jaber Khaleed Al Sabah - if he is retained in office - allegedly for ordering security forces to crack down on the [illegal] tribal primary elections.
According to Al Azimi, Jaber ordered "armoured vehicles and special forces to crack down on Kuwaitis", which was unacceptable.
For his part, Walid Al Tabatabai, called for the appointment of a new prime minister "who should vigorously fight corruption and reform the administration." Tabatabai, of the Salafi Alliance, opined that the outgoing government had failed under a tested but weak premier and should not be reappointed.
Jassem Al Khorafi, the outgoing Speaker of the House, who was re-elected, requested that Kuwait appoint three deputies to the prime minister - for economic, security and services - to better manage the Shaikhdom's affairs.
The implication here was that Shaikh Nasser required assistance given that the job was overwhelming the affable premier.
Accountability
Other parliamentarians chimed in with various requests, including pleas for a cabinet composed of elected deputies - whereas the law requires a minimum of one - made by the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.
While opinions differed, the latest mixed results essentially meant that no group enjoyed an absolute majority in parliament, with little or no chance for any coalition building.
Indeed, it was for this reason that the ruler reappointed his prime minister, who was not likely to introduce important modifications.
Therefore, chances were excellent that Kuwait will now enter another long-running row, which will further paralyse political life, and delay sorely needed economic reforms.
What will not change are the vigorous questioning that Kuwaiti ministers are periodically subjected to, which perpetuates the political struggle facing the country.
Kuwaitis clamour for accountability even as most recognise that the Al Sabah are privileged. Under the circumstances, what is likely to happen next, and what will Kuwaitis argue about?
Islamist and tribal deputies, who have traditionally rejected Al Sabah proposals for economic reform, will hold the line. They will insist on the Shaikhdom's preferred cradle-to-grave welfare system, insisting that this is the country's raison d'être.
More liberal elements will call for privatisation and economic reforms, which are controversial issues because they threaten to upset the existing balance of power.
Irrespective of these two preferences, Kuwaitis face two other challenges, which are the root causes of current doldrums: heightened sectarian sentiments and, equally important, a constitutional dispute that pits the ruling family against an increasingly sophisticated population.
Because all five Shiite parliamentarians are Islamists, including two members from the 11th assembly who took part in a controversial rally in March 2008 to mourn Emad Mughniyeh - the military commander of Lebanon's Hezbollah who was assassinated in Damascus - there is a danger of sectarian clashes.
The Mughniyeh question highlighted a treacherous polarisation that can only benefit extremists.
In fact, Kuwait's estimated native population of about one million is a third Shiite, which is non-negligible, even if they are under-represented in parliament.
Therefore, and while the new constituency law will assist the Al Sabah to better deal with political blocs, current sectarian tensions may lead to either more clashes or the gradual rise of effective political parties.
Naturally, what also irks Kuwaitis are ongoing ruling family disputes, which have a tendency to spill over in the body politic. While few are privy to internal Al Sabah schisms, most are amply aware of the states's constitutional boundaries, which require full adherence to secure harmony.
Under the circumstances, and to restore political stability, perhaps more than three deputies are necessary for Shaikh Nasser.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.
