After painstaking efforts, the League of Arab States (LAS)-brokered and Qatari-mediated talks in Doha produced an agreement to reconcile various Lebanese factions.
By all accounts, this remarkable accomplishment was due to the Emir of Qatar Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani's personal mediation with warring parties, which speaks well for Gulf peacemaking.
Is this a new paradigm for Arab diplomacy? Few may remember it, but when in 1954, Imam Ghalib Bin Ali established his "State of Oman" and applied for admission into the LAS, several League officials rushed for a map to locate where this unheard of new country might be located.
Though few Egyptian officials knew about Oman at the time, the LAS was neither effective, nor could it budge Oman's British decision-makers.
Likewise, on June 25, 1961, that is just a few days after Kuwait declared its independence from Britain (June 19), President Abdul Karim Qasim asserted the long-standing Iraqi claim to the Shaikhdom, which necessitated the deployment of British marines.
As the event was perceived by the LAS to be one involving British occupation rather than of any Iraqi threats, tensions were only reduced, after the LAS deployed a Saudi-led peacekeeping operation.
Even Bahrain, Qatar, and what is now the United Arab Emirates were all relegated to secondary stations before 1971, as British imperial needs required secure routes to India.
Though Arab nationalism mobilised individual aspirations, the LAS was ineffective to obtain accelerated independence, which occurred after Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan managed to persuade fellow rulers to act.
Only Saudi Arabia was relatively mature as a political entity, largely the result of astute initiatives adopted by King Abdul Aziz Bin Abdul Rahman, who mastered the game of nations by playing off British and American intruders against each other.
In fact, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the LAS was a pawn of Jamal Abdul Nasser and wallowed in futile strategies.
While the 1981 decision to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was largely a response to the putative Iranian threat to regional security, part of the GCC's raison d'être was to counter LAS ineffectiveness vis-à -vis rising hegemonic powers, including Iran and Iraq.
Gulf monarchies carefully aligned themselves with major Western powers without abandoning intrinsic Arab obligations. In other words, by clarifying what were genuine strategic objectives versus popular wishes, Gulf rulers acculturated themselves with results-oriented goals.
Rhetorical objectives
Indeed, most were livid to attend LAS summits, even if they acquiesced to lofty but largely rhetorical objectives. They often returned home dejected by their inabilities to effectuate concrete changes that improved conditions.
Some even stopped going altogether, perceiving the exercises as futile efforts, with little or no hope for specific pan-Arab initiatives.
Of course, several Arab States marked contemporary history by adopting epochal steps, including the 1989 Saudi-led Taif Accords for Lebanon, and various initiatives to defend the Palestinian question. Unfortunately, however, few intra-Arab disputes were resolved within the premier Arab conflict resolution arena.
It is within such a context that the Doha Agreement must be evaluated because Arabs, yes Arabs, proved that they could indeed act as peacemakers. Naturally, while it may be premature to celebrate because of the Lebanese tendency to commit political suicide, the experience should be recognised.
In fact, it may be safe to conclude that Gulf Arabs are taking the Arab World out of its morass, insisting that foreign intruders are not necessary to help broker accords.
One could be more daring, and declare that Gulf Arabs are rekindling the original aims of the LAS, whose very purpose is to strengthen "relations between member-states, the coordination of their policies to achieve co-operation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty" (Article II of Charter).
Since contemporary history illustrates how this goal was seldom met, the Doha paradigm stands out as a fresh contribution. As signatories to the March 13, 1950 "Treaty for joint Defence and Economic co-operation," all Arab countries must indeed coordinate security plans, even if little harmonisation occurs in reality.
Starting in 1981, and against some odds, this question was squarely addressed by GCC member-states who managed to embark on dramatic improvements.
Indeed, the experimentation went from rudimentary synchronisation to full-fledged cooperation, in yet another example of what Arab Gulf decision-makers were capable of.
One should not conclude from this analysis that Arab leaders have reached a comfort level comparable to what probably exists on the European continent.
Not yet, but one should nevertheless acknowledge the tremendous advances, recorded between 1981 and today. GCC States are now vanguard Arab peacemakers, able and willing to invest time and treasure to safeguard innate gains, as well as restore relevance to petrified institutions.
Therefore, not only did the Doha Agreement for Lebanon prevent a renewed civil war in that hapless country, it also galvanised an otherwise ossified League of Arab States to regain some of its lost authority.
The observant Shaikh Hamad must have realised this when he attended the March 29 Damascus summit. Although 11 heads of state bothered to grace the Syrian capital with their presences, all of the top leaders were absent, and Shaikh Hamad understood how low Arab affairs had stooped.
His personal quest to make amends starting with Lebanon is a good omen for Arabs in general and the LAS in particular. Chances are excellent that this success - provided he remains on the wobbly case - will augur well for the next Summit.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.
