Speaking before the Knesset during Israel's independence day celebrations, US President George Bush issued a stern warning: "Permitting the world's leading sponsor of terror to possess the world's deadliest weapons would be an unforgivable betrayal for future generations. For the sake of peace, the world must not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon".
While his seriousness is beyond doubt, does he have a workable strategy against Iran?
Irrespective of the periodic intelligence leaks and media hype, military operation against Iran is not a viable policy option. Sites associated with the Iranian nuclear programme are far and wide and a surgical strike, the dream of every military strategist, is unfeasible.
Unlike the 1981 Israeli operation against the Osirak reactor near Baghdad, the US would not have an element of surprise, a pre-condition for such operations.
It is immaterial if such a military option would be carried out by Israel or the US. While the former ostensibly has a better track record, the consequences would not be any different. Over the years, some of Israel's military successes have morphed into painful strategic liabilities.
On the eve of his departure from the White House, it would be suicidal for Bush to open another war front in the Middle East. With the presidential election just months away, such a course will divide the Republicans and alienate the Democrats. Not many Americans will rally around the Stars and Strips this time.
Moreover, Iran has numerous instruments of response at its disposal. It could strike back at Israel, a convenient political target for any beleaguered Islamic state, through missiles, or it could attack the American forces in the Gulf.
It could respond asymmetrically, through its proxies in Lebanon (Hezbollah) or in the Palestinian areas (Hamas). Or it could revert back to the covert operations against Western targets in the Middle East and elsewhere, as was the case in the early 1980s.
Of late, some have persuasively argued that the Iranian capacity to harm Western interests is exaggerated and that a military strike against Iran would not be costlier, or at the very least, would be cost effective. Not long ago, Bush was given similar advice on Iraq.
The shock and awe campaign soon turned into an American quagmire. With American casualties in Iraq well past the September 11 toll, the US President should be weary of another "easy" victory over Iran.
At best, a military strike would be a temporary setback for Iran. However, it would undoubtedly energise Iran to pursue the weaponisation process. Rather than weakening Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it would bolster the regime and its conservative support base.
In short, military option continues to be unpredictable and unattractive. Will this force the US to do a North Korea in the Middle East and make peace with a nuclear Iran?
Not necessarily. The US has a more powerful instrument in the form of economic sanctions. As historical examples such as the American boycott of Cuba, Arab boycott of Israel or the UN sanctions against Iraq proved, sanctions are generally effective only against the weak and the willing.
Iran is increasingly becoming vulnerable. It has the second largest gas reserves after Russia. But it is a net importer of petroleum products, thank to sanctions and production difficulties.
Moreover, the first vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in September 2005 signalled Iranian isolation on the nuclear issue. Since the second vote the following February to refer the matter to the UN Security Council, the world body has passed three resolutions against Iran.
Since 2006, China and Russia, the supposed "friends" of Iran, have joined hands with the US. Such a widespread disapproval of Iran should not be underestimated.
Milder
These sanctions are milder and far less than what the US hoped for but they conveyed an unmistakable message to Tehran: international disapproval. While the first two resolutions were adopted unanimously, Indonesia abstained on the third resolution last March.
It is true that the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA or Iran Sanctions Act since 2004) has not been effective. Many countries have ignored the provision banning energy-related investments in Iran in excess of $20 million.
While brandishing the ILSA to countries such as India, Washington has not capitalised on this powerful instrument. Emphasis on adroit diplomacy with Security Council partners may well unlock the potential of a targeted sanctions regime.
At the same time, through covert pressure, the US has curtailed the presence of a number of Western banks that were operating in Iran.
In April this year, Treasury officials told a House Committee that they had persuaded at least 40 international banks from financing Iranian imports. For its part Iran, has succeeded in circumventing this measure by relying on non-Western banks.
Even though a number of Western, Russian and Chinese companies have come under limited sanctions, the US has refrained from large-scale to sanctions. Enforcement of ILSA sanctions, for example, would have to factor in the cascading effect of spiralling oil prices and their adverse impact upon the American economy.
The options on the table against Iran are clearly limited. The moment for a military strike against Iran has clearly passed, in spite of Bush's fears. Their limited utility aside, sanctions continue to represent the best policy instrument at America's disposal.
But like any military operation, however, they need to be marshalled, coordinated and used decisively. A greater effort at international diplomacy may well work in America's interests.
The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's language of "tough diplomacy" with Iran at an AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) conference on June 3, ultimately represents the only real choice for America and its allies.
Full article on OpinionAsia.com. Copyright: OpinionAsia.
P.R. Kumaraswamy is an Associate Professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India.
