Three incidents, the last a threat, dominated the headlines over a one week period in Pakistan this month. Eleven Pakistani soldiers and 10 militants were killed on June 11 in an air strike by US-led forces based in Afghanistan. The situation was greatly exacerbated on June 13, when Taliban insurgents mounted a well-coordinated attack on the prison in the southern city of Kandahar. Some 1,000 prisoners, including hundreds of Taliban militants, including some Al Qaida operatives escaped.
Two days later, Afghan President Hamid Karzai threatened to send troops over the border into Pakistan to confront militants based there. He said that when militants crossed over from Pakistan to kill Afghans and coalition troops, his nation had the right to retaliate in "self-defence". It was widely believed that Karzai made such a statement after getting clearance from the Americans.
Miles away, but within the neighbourhood, an Indian journalist Amit Baruah, wrote an article in the Hindustan Times on June 17 entitled 'Who do you thank for better India-Pakistan ties? (Clue: Neither of them)'. Baruah tried to solve his riddle by asserting that the United States had simply superseded India as Pakistan's most hated foreign enemy. While the Pakistan government continues to emphasise its whole-hearted commitment to fight alongside the United States, as far as the Pakistani people are concerned, the Americans were hell bent on destroying Pakistan.
Considering that the United States and Pakistan were once upon a time close allies through bilateral and regional security pacts, it is a matter of some puzzlement how that relationship has transformed.
There can be no denying that the US-Pakistan relationship has experienced dramatic vicissitudes and metamorphoses after 1954 when Pakistan was co-opted in the worldwide US policy of containing Soviet Communism and granted substantial military aid.
The Americans, however, were always sceptical about Pakistan's democratic credentials. On the other hand, the Pakistanis were not averse to fighting communism, but their main objective was to acquire American weapons and technology to brace their military capability against their much bigger rival, India. There is little to suggest that the core of this relationship is any different today. Over the years, Pakistan helped America trace and capture Al Qaida operatives but could not succeed in destroying Taliban elements ensconced in the rugged mountainous enclaves along the Pakistan-Afghan border. As a result, the Taliban continue to operate in that region and regularly menace the coalition forces.
Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, who heads a coalition government, has had to appear to be independent of American influence and pressure in order to maintain a popular image. In doing so, he has announced a unilateral change in policy towards terrorism, particularly towards Pakistani Taliban elements.
Understanding
Consequently 'peace deals' were arranged in Swat and other tribal areas with the militants. The basic understanding was that these militants would not take part in violent action within Pakistan but would be allowed to apply Islamic law in areas under their control.
The Americans found such an arrangement a breach on the part of the Pakistan government's commitment to partake in the war on terror. This has been denied by Pakistan. Recent events bring out in sharp relief the growing chasm in the ambivalent US-Pakistan liaison.
The United States cannot wage its war on terror without Pakistani assistance and cooperation, but direct American military intervention has not gone down well in Pakistan and has embarrassed the government. On the other hand, the Americans are not likely to desist from striking at targets within Pakistan if they believe that key Taliban and Al Qaida forces were hiding in them. Equally, Pakistan cannot abjure its commitment to partake in the war on terror without adversely affecting its position in South Asia.
Given that the United States and India already see themselves as 'strategic partners', Pakistan would not want to alienate itself from the United States. It cannot hope to establish a Sino-Pakistan counterweight in this region because China may not respond with enthusiasm to such an overture.
With the strategic necessity of both parties to each other obvious, notwithstanding current mutual misgivings and reservations, the instrumentalist character of the US-Pakistan relationship looks likely to endure. In this regard, a revision may only prove timely when a new US administration takes over at the end of this year.
- OpinionAsia, 2006 - 2008.
Ishtiaq Ahmad is Professor of Political Science and a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore. A full version of this article is available on www.opinionasia.org
