US President George W. Bush has often been criticised for not having an endgame to his Iraq policies, and, noted a recent editorial of The New York Times, "he stubbornly refuses" to have one.
In the past few days, two setbacks to his Iraq policies have highlighted the vagaries of managing imperial designs, and the unpredictability of policies anchored in half-truths and improvisations: The Iraqi parliament went into recess without passing an election law considered necessary for the provincial elections - now jeopardised. And a security alliance with Iraq was not concluded by the informal deadline of July 31.
Failing to agree on the provincial election law, despite Bush's personal intervention, robbed him, possibly for good, of the opportunity to claim lasting political success in Iraq before he leaves office. He is understandably anxious to rescue his legacy from being indelibly marked by his disastrous war in Iraq.
But Iraqi parliamentarians have shown little concern for Bush's legacy, and have expressed resentment at the pressure Washington brought to bear on Iraqi leaders.
Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish parliamentarian, blamed outside pressure: "It's interfering in an inappropriate way with the Iraqis," he said. "I don't know why they are so much in a hurry for this law..."
The highly popular Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr suspects the government of Prime Minister Nour Al Maliki of deliberately delaying the provincial elections until he and his Dawa party consolidated more power.
Sunni politicians, whose cooperation with the forces of occupation brought some decrease in daily violence, were counting on being rewarded with increased political influence in the government or in the provincial elections.
Neither seems likely in the near future. Shaikh Hamid Al Hayis, founder of the Anbar Awakening movement expressed the Sunnis' resentment: "We couldn't make a big change in the government structure. That pushed us to work to make change in the provincial council. But even that we can't touch."
But the most intractable hurdle in the failed negotiations between Iraqi leaders centred on the future political control of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.
The Kurds want to translate their demographic power in the city into uncontested control and eventually annexation of Kirkuk to the quasi-autonomous region of Kurdistan. But Kirkuk is also home to Sunni Arabs and Turkmens who reject the Kurdish ambitions and insist on equitable power sharing arrangements.
Kurdish leaders wanted a referendum that would consolidate their power in Kirkuk. Turkmens and Sunni Arabs welcomed the failure of negotiations as a sign that Iraqi leaders are anxious to preserve Iraqi unity-which would be threatened by the inclusion of Kirkuk into the Kurdistan region.
Recent tensions between the three ethnic groups in Kirkuk erupted into deadly violence and clashes between Kurds and Turkmens that left 29 people dead.
Bush's failure to persuade Iraqi leaders to pass the provincial election law and the recent violence undermined the only endgame he seems to have: to claim that he was passing on to the next administration a more stable situation in Iraq.
Security alliance
The failure of American and Iraqi officials to conclude a security alliance with Iraq before the informal deadline of July 31, is another setback for Bush.
Administration officials claimed that a security alliance would be concluded with Iraq in the coming days or weeks.
The optimism about reaching agreement reportedly came after Bush had to agree, reluctantly no doubt, to Iraqi demands for a "general time horizon" which Iraqis could view as a timetable for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iraq.
The Bush White House has refused to divulge its position in the negotiations, anxious not to reveal the extent of Bush's imperial ambitions. But details of the American position were leaked to the British newspaper The Independent.
Washington reportedly wanted some 50 military bases in Iraq, immunity for its military personnel and contractors from Iraqi legal system, the right to pursue military operations against terrorists - as defined by Washington - without prior permission from Baghdad, and control of Iraqi airspace.
If a security alliance with Iraq were to be signed on these reported terms, it would be nothing less than the modern equivalent of the humiliating unequal treaties which imperial Britain imposed on China following the Opium War in the middle of the 19th century.
The Iraqi government was quick to see the enormous discredit that such a military alliance would bring upon it and Al Maliki put up an unexpectedly tough resistance, which must have surprised and annoyed Bush.
Al Maliki told journalists in Jordan: "The Iraqis will not consent to an agreement that infringes their sovereignty."
He emphasised: "We cannot give permission to the American forces' independent right to arrest Iraqis or execute operations against terrorism. We cannot allow them to use the Iraqi skies and waters at all times."
The Al Maliki government is concerned about possible plots to overthrow the government and looked to Washington for support, but none was forthcoming.
Al Maliki had obtained a pledge from Washington, in November 2007, "to provide security assurances to the Iraqi Government to deter any external aggression and to ensure the integrity of Iraq's territory".
However, this pledge was diluted in the March 7 American draft of the agreement which simply states: "The US and Iraq are to consult immediately whenever the territorial integrity or political independence of Iraq is threatened."
The potential regional Sunni alliance, the possibility of an Arab-backed or Turkish supported campaign against Al Maliki government, and the shaky American support have strengthened Al Maliki's rapprochement with Tehran.
Undermining Bush's anti-Iran strategy, Al Maliki pledged to visiting Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. "We will not allow Iraq to become a platform for harming the security of Iran and neighbours."
Bush is learning that colonial wars and imperial designs are harder to manage than he ever thought.
Professor Adel Safty is Unesco Chair of Leadership and President of the School of Government and Leadership, Bahcesehir University, Istanbul. He is author-editor of 14 books including From Camp David to the Gulf, and Leadership and Democracy, New York, 2004.
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