Nicolas Sarkozy has made several concordant declarations which led to the conclusion that France would soon reintegrate the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) military structures it had left in 1966 under Charles De Gaulle's presidency.
Sarkozy is familiar with strong remarks about French-American friendship. Therefore, a new debate inflames French political elites, some of them being furious about it while some others are delighted.
Is France radically changing its foreign policy? Do we assist to a new Atlantist alignment? Is it the end of the strategic autonomous stand which has been France's diplomatic trademark since de Gaulle's presidency?
The reality is far more complex. It is not the first time that a newly elected president expresses the major concern of being closer to Washington.
Obviously, the opposition to the Iraq war has transformed Jacques Chirac, former president of France, into a little devil for many Americans, despite the warming of relations after 2005.
Yet, one must remind that just after his election in 1995, Chirac wanted to reintegrate Nato in exchange for the attribution of the Southern command to a French officer and the so-called "Europeanisation" (giving more responsibilities to the Europeans in the Atlantic alliance) of Nato.
In 1981, Mitterrand has supported, to the greatest furore of other European socialists, the deployment of US nuclear missiles in order to restore the atomic balance in Europe.
In 1974, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was disregarded as pro-American, his policy of greater cooperation with Germany being interpreted as paving the way to American domination over Europe.
When Georges Pompidou came to the Elysée, the conventional wisdom was that it was a rare opportunity to put an end to de Gaulle's personal opposition to the American leadership.
Last but not least, when de Gaulle came to power, one of his first diplomatic moves was to ask president Dwight Eisenhower to create a triumvirate (a shared leadership that would have had included Paris, Washington and London) for Nato.
The French proposal was rebuffed by the Americans. Every time Paris was asking for a closer cooperation, the Americans refused its demands.
Therefore, Sarkozy is more in the continuity of rather than in the rupture with the beginning of other French presidents' mandates. On top of that, the rupture would not be so significant.
France is not really that far from Nato. It is only absent from two committees: the nuclear planning group and the defence plans committee. France took part in the Kosovo war under the aegis of Nato in 1999 and is widely involved in Afghanistan, again under Nato structures.
Since the end of the Cold War, a steady rapprochement has occurred. One must not forget that the French and the American chiefs of staff signed an agreement in 1967 (immediately after de Gaulle's spectacular opting out in 1966) which was designed to plan French participation under American command in case of a war in Europe.
Thereby, a reintegration would not constitute a diplomatic U-turn.
However, it is true that such a move would be a strong and meaningful symbol. Beyond technical and operational aspects, a reintegration would be perceived in Europe as well as in the rest of the world as the acceptance by Paris of US leadership.
The special status France enjoys vis-Ã -vis the United States has many advantages that it would be risky to renounce to without any compensation.
The challenge is now to obtain the reinforcement of the European defence pillar inside Nato in exchange for French reintegration, a long-term goal of France that the US has always refused, whatever the official acceptance.
Sarkozy put two conditions for French reintegration: the acceptance by Washington of this Europeanisation and a major role for France inside Nato. Therefore, there are only two options left.
If Washington accepts these two prerequisites, France will not be at risk reintegrating Nato. The organisation would become a totally different structure than the one Paris left five decades ago.
If the Americans refuse these conditions once again, it will become useless to move. The challenge is to obtain real concessions from the US.
There is also another condition: to cease with the project that tries to transform the Atlantic alliance into a "global" one by enlarging both its mission (war on terror) and its composition (adding Japan, Australia, South Korea and so on). This would turn Nato into a tool for a clash of civilisations.
Dr Pascal Boniface is the founder and director of IRIS (Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques). He has published or edited more than 40 books dealing with international relations, nuclear deterrence and disarmament, European security and French international policy.
