Media attention in a rapidly evolving political situation is not always focused on its essence; it may easily turn the spotlight on an aspect which seems to be unusual and, therefore, relatively more newsworthy.
In the post-election scenario in Pakistan the substantive question is the formation of the new government that can be undertaken only through the difficult art of coalition-building.
Notwithstanding this basic challenge of the new parliamentary realities a disproportionate degree of interest has been aroused by hectic western diplomacy that goes beyond the legitimate needs of foreign diplomats and their governments to elicit information.
They are being openly accused of trying to influence the formation of a ruling coalition and the composition of the new government.
The conventional version of this rather exaggerated foreign preoccupation with Pakistan's domestic politics is easily summarised. Led by the United States, the "West" that includes geographically remote countries such as Japan and Australia, has had a seven-year-old stake in Pervez Musharraf's absolute rule.
Belatedly, the West recognised the fact that this war would be more effectively waged if Musharraf's power base could be broadened with carefully calibrated restoration of democracy.
The peoples' verdict on February 18, however, deviated significantly from the game plan and brought to the fore political forces that were unwilling to accept Musharraf's supreme role.
Embroiled in a rapidly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan as well as in the borderlands of Pakistan, western powers are feverishly engaged in promoting a new alliance between Musharraf and the winners of the election. Allegedly, they combine persuasion with coercion.
Lack of experience
Obviously, elements of this story have been over-stated. The reason for that is the conspicuous lack of subtlety in western diplomacy seen as much in the demanding tone of public statements from Washington as in the hyperactive daily schedule of western envoys in Islamabad.
The dynamics of the US election militate against Washington acting with discretion in what should have been an exercise in quiet diplomacy.
Democratic presidential hopeful Barak Obama threatens Pakistan with cross-border raids from Afghanistan while Hillary Clinton attributes this aggressive posturing to his lack of experience and claims to have an alternative approach to Pakistan.
To the nagging question as to who lost Iraq and Afghanistan another question is being added: who is about to lose Pakistan to the West.
This is a spurious question as the vote in Pakistan is not a rejection of the West but of a purely militaristic approach to the highly complex insurgency in the tribal belt which has a seamless relationship with the battle for Afghanistan.
It is an open secret that the US has not looked favourably at the occasional efforts by Pakistani planners to develop a mix of political and military means to stabilise the situation on the Pakistani side of the border.
The Pakistani vote is, therefore, also an expression of dismay in the presumed loss of national sovereignty during Musharraf's watch.
Since Pakistani losses have been considerably higher than the losses of all the Nato and ISAF forces in Afghanistan put together and since the militants are taking a heavy toll of civilian lives all over Pakistan with suicide bombings, the public opinion is inflamed.
Complex history
The dichotomy between a pro-western orientation of most governments in Pakistan and equally strong reservations about it amongst the people has a long and complex history.
It began when people protested against Pakistan joining the Baghdad Pact and has aggravated during subsequent alliances of opportunity when the US enlisted Pakistan's support in rolling back the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan only to abandon it once the expediency had passed.
On its part Pakistan asserted its independence in seeking a strategic alliance with China and on most issues concerning the Middle East.
Left to them Pakistani politicians would probably resolve the question of Musharraf's future role by reconciling their present different perspectives on legal and constitutional matters left behind by eight years of autocratic rule.
The western preference for a government that continues to be dominated by Musharraf regardless of constitutional propriety has landed Pakistan's restored democracy between a rock and a hard place.
The three leading parties are, on the one hand, holding fast to the need for unity without which no stable government can be formed and, on the other, vexed by their ill concealed differences on addressing the Musharraf factor.
They need to find a way out of a potential impasse between a pragmatic approach to him and the hard-line view that he must step down.
The quest for such a compromise seems to be harder than what political leaders publicly admit and one major reason for that difficulty is the outside pressure.
Nobody as yet knows what to do about it as the nation wants a candid review of the strategy for fighting extremism and terrorism rocking the society while Washington demands simple compliance with its global policy.
Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former ambassador and foreign secretary of Pakistan.
