The utterly predictable has come to pass and Dmitry Medvedev, the anointed heir to Vladimir Putin, has duly been elected the next president of Russia. Even his 70.2 per cent of the vote on a 69.6 per cent turnout was predictable. The figures are respectable on both counts - not completely unbelievable, but probably a bit too good to be true.
His support was very much what the opinion polls had been predicting, although the turnout was higher than normal for such a one-horse race. But then, the Kremlin's system of "managed democracy" is all about management, and bears no relation to democracy.
Everything about this election was intended to suggest stability and continuity. Medvedev is not exactly a clone of Putin - most importantly, he was never a member of the KGB, or its successor security agency, the FSB - but he will be keeping his mentor beside him as prime minister.
Most people expect Putin to continue to pull the levers of power, and Medvedev to reflect his views. Yet Russia's history suggests that relationship may be more difficult to manage than it seems: the Kremlin can only have one Tsar, they say.
The president is the one with the power, while the prime minister executes his orders. To reverse those roles, without a change in the constitution, is asking for trouble. So why did Putin hand over power in this peculiar way, intended to demonstrate stability, but just as likely to create uncertainty?
There are two possible explanations: that he could not trust anyone else to take over; or that he was persuaded to stay, for fear of unleashing a furious faction-fight over the succession.
The first explanation may be the more obvious, but the second rings more true. Several close observers believe Putin wanted to quit, but the grey barons of the Kremlin - all of whom have lucrative vested interests they do not wish to lose - would not let him. There is no love lost between some of the most powerful participants.
On the surface, Medvedev and Putin will probably do little to disturb the equilibrium for as long as possible. But a few key players should be watched to see which way the wind is blowing.
The most important is Igor Sechin, deputy chief of staff to Putin, and leader of the faction of siloviki - FSB and former KGB operatives - at the heart of the Kremlin. He is also chairman of Rosneft, the state-controlled oil company that took over the assets of Yukos when its owner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was jailed.
Sechin is close to Putin, not Medvedev. If he loses his job in the Kremlin, his faction will be weakened. But at least if Sechin keeps his role at Rosneft, he will be not be complaining financially.
Another leading figure to watch is Sergei Ivanov, Medvedev's equal as first deputy prime minister, and former defence minister, who was long seen as Putin's first choice for president.
As a former KGB man, he might have been a bigger threat to all the warring factions but he has kept loyally silent at being passed over. He is the sort of ally Medvedev needs, with inside knowledge of the security services and the military establishment.
The survival of Alexei Kudrin, the finance minister, is seen as critical to the continued pursuit of relatively liberal economic policies.
One indicator of the liberals' influence in the new regime will be the fate of Sergei Storchak, Kudrin's deputy finance minister, who is in jail facing fraud charges. That move was seen as a coup by Sechin's faction against the Kudrin team.
Keeping the balance of power would mean keeping all of the above. That would suggest Putin is calling the shots. If any are demoted, it would be a vital indicator of a shift in power. The election result may seem predictable, but the consequences in the Kremlin may not be boring at all.
