Russia's announcement that it is working to host a Middle East peace conference to be held some time this year is an interesting development in the muted high-powered political chess game between Moscow and Washington. The idea was first put forward in Annapolis last November, when more than 30 countries gathered in the US Naval base at the behest of the Bush administration to kickstart the ailing Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
But last week Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov repeated the suggestion in Syria and later on in Ramallah. As a member of the international Quartet and co-sponsor (then as the USSR) of the Madrid peace conference, Moscow's initiative should neither be surprising nor suspicious. But for some it is both.
Russia has been sucked into the Arab-Israeli conflict since the early days of the Cold War. As Washington leaned heavily in favour of the nascent Jewish state, the so-called progressive Arab regimes sought to adjust the balance of power by allying themselves with America's strategic foe, the Soviet Union.
Under Jamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt rearmed itself with Russian weaponry in preparation for a decisive war. Syria soon followed her example and the Middle East became yet another battlefront in the Cold War. The region was polarised, with traditional states seeking US help and protection not from Israel but against the perceived threat of revolutionary pro-Moscow Arab juntas.
Special relationship
Moscow delivered not only military hardware but much needed political backing in the Security Council and other world forums. The Palestinian liberation movement could not have survived without the special relationship with the Communist bloc, which provided training, hardware and intelligence.
In the military field Soviet contribution was most evident in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. While Egypt and Syria were unable to deal a decisive blow to the Israeli army, Russian technology and hardware were instrumental in giving the Arabs a precious symbolic victory. But the war underlined America's unwavering commitment to protecting its Jewish ally.
Egypt's Anwar Sadat understood the lessons of that war more than any other Arab leader. With the military option a spent force, he realised that ending the conflict with Israel will have to take another route. His decision to sever strategic links with Moscow was a bold move which was followed by the unveiling of his peace offer to Israel.
The Camp David peace negotiations, following Sadat's historic visit to Occupied Jerusalem in 1977, distanced Moscow from the region even further. It was able to hold on to its ties with Syria and Iraq, but Egypt's departure dented the Soviet power in the Middle East. On the other hand, the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel secured America's foothold in the Arab world and bolstered its new role as the only viable mediator in the peace process.
The 1980s brought further erosion in Moscow's influence in the Middle East. The Soviet Union was fighting a war of attrition in Afghanistan and was being outmanoeuvred by the Reagan administration over ballistic missile treaties. And in Europe the Iron Curtain was about to tumble.
Iraq's eviction from Kuwait in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the ensuing siege of the Saddam Hussain regime coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the end of Soviet Union. The Cold War was over and the Arabs could no longer count on Moscow's valuable support in their unsettled conflict with Israel. The PLO under Yasser Arafat was already negotiating with Washington and soon the Palestinians would be invited to a peace conference in Madrid.
The Middle East had succumbed to America's buoyant control and the world was adjusting to a single superpower. Honest broker or not, Washington became the only viable broker around and it was pushing hard for a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
As the new Russian Federation emerged in place of the once-mighty Soviet Union it had a heap of internal problems to deal with. Thus Moscow's influence over the Middle East peace process became negligent. The Arab side had to convince Washington that an equitable deal was needed to bring the conflict to an end.
America loved its new role in a unipolar world, and the oil-rich Middle East was now its backyard to do with it what it wanted. Russia was busy mending the chaos that its new leaders had left behind. The Warsaw Pact had long been buried and now America was recruiting Moscow's old allies into the expanding Nato alliance.
Under Vladimir Putin, the Russians found a strong leader who was willing to act tough in Chechnya and in Europe to protect the remaining assets of the defunct Soviet empire. The invasion of Iraq by the US and Britain in 2003 was seen by many in Moscow as the first step in a grand design by Washington's neo-conservatives to encircle and isolate Russia. Regardless of the efficacy of such concerns, the Kremlin was slowly coming back into the old game of the Cold War.
Moscow's recent interest in the Middle East must be seen in that context. Russia has carefully sided with Iran over its nuclear programme, and it has reinvigorated its role in the Quartet while normalising relations with moderate Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Lavrov's visit to Syria at this stage, a few days before the convening of the Arab summit in Damascus, is symbolic but important.
There is no doubt that Russia's renewed interest in the Middle East is part of a new power struggle that is now taking place between Russia and the US. Washington has been aggressive in its move to deploy long-range missiles in Eastern Europe and in luring new recruits to Nato such as Georgia and Ukraine. It is clear that Moscow views such moves with great suspicion and as a direct threat to its national security. The Kosovo affair was deplored by Russians as an attempt to undermine its control over enclaves and territories in its own domain.
Against such a backdrop, Lavrov's call for a peace conference to be held in Moscow can be viewed either as a tactical move on the high-powered chess board, or as a genuine attempt to further the peace process. My guess is it is the former, at least for now.
Osama Al Sharif is a veteran journalist and publisher based in Jordan.
