Back in mid-1990s when I was Pakistan's ambassador to Boris Yeltsin's Russian Federation, Moscow was earnestly engaged in pre-empting a Nato push into the former Warsaw Pact countries through institutionalised diplomacy.
In quieter tones, Russian officials, however, would acknowledge that it could not be entirely prevented though Moscow would make sure that Nato would not violate red lines that were being strongly indicate to the West.
Thus the loss of the Baltic States to the Western sphere of influence might be tolerable but there would be no question of Russia permitting any encroachment on say Ukraine or Belarus.
Not long after I left Moscow three erstwhile Warsaw Pact members - Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - joined Nato. In 2004 another seven states were welcomed into the military alliance. It was a qualitatively different development as it went beyond the Warsaw Pact and included the three Baltic States that had been an "integral" part of the former Soviet Union.
The situation for Russia was greatly complicated by the so-called colour revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia with both countries becoming focal points of a new and intense kind of East-West rivalry. Having restored Russian pride and more importantly its economy President Vladimir Putin stiffened opposition to Nato's seemingly endless plans for expansion into areas beyond the original Nato treaty area and his speech in Munich last year is mostly remembered for his rejection of the rationale for Nato's expansion and for describing it as a "serious provocation".
Domestic politics in Ukraine and to a lesser extent in Georgia has reflected tensions over the projects of westernisation that include eventual membership of Nato.
The 2008 Nato summit in Bucharest, which was once a hardline doctrinaire communist capital, has turned the spotlight on a reinvigorated bid by the US President George W. Bush to open the Nato doors to these two states.
Ignoring the dominant view in a number of West European states including France, Germany and Italy that it would strain relation with Russia, he has strongly supported the idea of inviting both Ukraine and Georgia into what Nato calls "membership action plans" (Maps) that offer a streamlined procedure for later admission.
In doing so he has the full consent of President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia who maintains that failure to withhold this invitation would be tantamount to appeasement of Moscow.
The Ukrainian posture articulated by the pro-West President Viktor Yushchenko who is aware of a strong pro-Russian feelings in the eastern half of his country is more nuanced though his destination is not different from that of Georgia.
Because of marked differences between Bush and the major continental powers and because of Putin's personal intervention in Bucharest this summit may settle for an approach that does not rock the boat too much now but fits into Nato Secretary-General's assessment that the membership of these two former components of the Soviet state would not be a question of " if "but "when "it materialises.
Reluctant
Much further east, the Afghan war stands largely outsourced to Nato though its rather reluctant contingents rely heavily on American air power and Special Forces. Many voices in the West now argue that the Afghan war cannot be won by military means alone and that Nato should concentrate on winning the hearts and minds of the people.
Yet Bush has once again insisted that the war must be continued to its logical conclusion which apparently for him means liquidation of "Afghan extremists".
The Nato summit is being watched in Pakistan with interest and concern. The newly installed government in Islamabad is caught between American pressure to intensify military efforts to put down the militants and a rising demand from virtually all sections of the electorate that has mandated this new government to diversify its strategy for combating extremism.
There have been reports that in the highly complicated bargains presumably being negotiated between Moscow and Washington on issues like the anti-missile defence shield in the Czech Republic and Poland and Nato's further expansion, Moscow may offer an overland transit route for supplies for western forces in Afghanistan.
Apparently the US wants to reduce its dependence on Pakistan because of the growing opposition to an exclusively military solution of Pakistan's own bitter problems with terrorists. For the Russian route the Central Asian states will have to be on board.
Be it as it may, Nato will find it difficult to dispense with intelligence cooperation with Islamabad. Pakistan's new government is virtually committed to a review of the existing policy but how far it can actually deviate from it, given Bush's unchanged emphasis on a decisive military victory in Afghanistan, remains to be seen. While it will take Ukraine and Georgia few years to implement Maps if approved now, Pakistan has to contend with Nato forces at its door step.
Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former ambassador and foreign secretary of Pakistan.
