On Wednesday, US President George W. Bush attended the Nato summit in Bucharest, his last before leaving office in January 2009. During the summit, Bush lobbied to overcome opposition to granting Georgia and Ukraine full membership in the Western security organisation. He also tried to convince allies to send more troops to Afghanistan and support a limited European missile-defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic. These objectives reflect US endeavours to adopt a dual containment policy against both Russia and Islamist extremism.
Originally, Nato was created in 1949 as a response to the growing strength of the Soviet Union and the military threat it posed to Western Europe. From its inception until the early 1990s, Nato functioned as a classic collective security organisation, by definition and practice. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union deprived the military alliance of the reason and prerequisite for its existence. Yet, it did not resign itself to heading towards extinction.
In 1991, at the Copenhagen summit, Nato's core function in the post-Cold War era was defined as to providing a "stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes". The provision of security and the maintenance of stability within Nato and the regions immediately surrounding it became the focal point of Nato's new raison d'être, practically replacing its paramount function of the provision of collective defence for its members.
Rhetoric
Yet, the failure of Nato to respond collectively and act decisively in Bosnia made this statement more of rhetoric than action; hence, emerged the need to define a new mission and new concept for the military alliance. In February 1995, former secretary general, Willy Claes, defined the new role of the military alliance as to confront the "threat of Islamic fundamentalism". But, this statement, which was presented in such an awkward manner, provoked a wave of public anger throughout the Islamic world, literally forcing Washington to dismiss it out of hand.
After September 11, 2001, caution became no longer an option for the US; the enemy was firmly located and the new role of Nato was clearly stated as to fighting "Islamist terrorism". Since 9/11, Islam has been viewed in Washington in a way that tended to equate all of its manifestations with terrorism. Theoretically, the US made no distinction between terrorism as politically-motivated violence and Islamism as a legitimate social force aimed at challenging Western influences in the Islamic world. Operationally, the US viewed Islamism as a military-security threat to its policies and interests around the globe. The cornerstone of US policy has, thus, become to weaken the influence of Islamist movements by gathering intelligence about them, by depleting their financial resources, by intimidating supportive popular environments, and by other covert counterterrorism operations.
To draw support from its Nato partners and make the case against Islam convincing, the US resorted to Cold War tactics whereby communism was replaced by Islamism as a parallel ideology and sequential enemy. US policy-makers have frequently used "Islamist terror" as the replacement for "the communist menace" or the "evil empire" as the ideological enemy against which Nato resources should be directed. Although on record the US has fervently asserted that it only oppose terrorism and has no quarrel with the religion of Islam, its policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine have left no doubt about the real target of American power.
Eventually, US policy towards Islamist activism won support amongst Nato allies. To meet the challenge of the phony Islamist threat, Nato leaders made a radical overhaul of their alliance at a summit in Prague in November 2002. The change included the removal of a passage from Nato convention that reads: "The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: None of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence". Nato's role was thus transformed from collective defence to possible pre-emptive action against Islamists in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Russia's new assertiveness and attempts to reclaim great power status under Vladimir Putin have surprised Nato's strategists. The adoption of a dual containment policy suggests that Nato has recognised the return of the Cold War atmosphere but with the Islamists on the other side of the trench this time.
Dr Marwan Kabalan is a lecturer in Media and International Relations, Faculty of Political Science and Media, Damascus University, Damascus, Syria.
