The war in Georgia is the product of a clash between Washington's pursuit of unchallenged hegemony and an assertive Russia. It was also driven by the mindless assumption that Russia could be ignored and provoked without paying a price
Following the collapse of the communist system, American strategic priorities were articulated in a 1992 Pentagon document, which states: "Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere."
Further, US strategic nuclear weapons must "continue to target vital aspects of the former Soviet military establishment", because Russia will remain "the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the US".
The commitment to defending American primacy in a world dominated by the United States contained within it the seeds of challenges and confrontations.
The pursuit of unchallenged American hegemony was relatively uncontested during the era of Mikhail Gorbachev when Russia was in disarray, and during the reign of Boris Yeltsin when Russia was accommodating -which explains their popularity in the West.
For the past eight years, Vladimir Putin, with the help of oil money, focused on building Russian economic and military strength while asserting a sense of Russian national pride-which explains his popularity in Russia.
In a speech in Munich at a Nato meeting on February 10, 2007, Putin challenged the American hegemonic drive because "it means one single centre of force and one single master". He rejected American unilateralism as a formula for disaster: "The United States has overstepped its borders in all spheres," he said "and has imposed itself on other states". Ignoring Russian warnings, the Bush administration proceeded with agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic for the installation of anti-missile defence system, which Russia viewed as a provocation and a threat.
With Washington's support, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline started south of Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, and ran through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean coast, bypassing Russian pipelines.
There was no mystery about Washington's objective: "American officials prefer a route," The BBC reported, "that would weaken Russia's stranglehold on regional pipeline network and leave Iran on the sidelines.
American presence in the region will also give Washington leverage over China, whose growing energy needs will create dependency on pipeline routes in Central Asia.
Came to power
The Bush administration encouraged the confrontational orientation of the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, who came to power after campaigning on a platform of integrating the two breakaway regions into Georgia. He stifled the opposition and rebuilt his army with weapons and training from the US and Israel.
In February this year, The European Union and the US moved to recognise the independence of Kosovo from Serbia over the objections of Russia. As a show of his strong pro-Americanism and loyalty to Bush, Saakashvili sent to Iraq the third largest military contingent after the US and Britain. As a reward he urged Bush to accept his small country in Nato.
At a Nato summit meeting in Bucharest, Romania, on April 4 this year, Bush recklessly lobbied for support for extending Nato membership to two more former republics of the Soviet Union: Ukraine and Georgia, thus further extending the encirclement of Russia.
At the same Nato meeting, Putin was unequivocally clear: "We view the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders," he said, as a "direct threat to the security of our country. The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice. National security is not based on promises".
At a meeting in Sochi, Russia, between Bush and Putin the next day, Putin reportedly told Bush, admitting Ukraine and Georgia into Nato would be crossing Russia's 'red lines'.
American military training of the Georgian army continued unabated, and the two countries engaged in highly visible military exercise. A former senior intelligence analyst told the New York Times: "We were training Saakashvili's army... which he could use for adventures," he said. "The feeling in the intelligence community was that this was a very high-risk endeavour."
On August 7, Saakashvili, emboldened by the flow of American and Israeli arms, and completely misreading the Russian mood and the American encouragement, foolishly sent his army into South Ossetia.
Saakashvili was surprised by the Russian punitive response. He naively expected that Washington would risk a military confrontation with Russia for the sake of Georgia. Similarly, Bush seems to have expected that his taunting of Russia would go unchallenged.
Last week US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggested that the administration had learned a lesson. "The United States," she announced, "would not push for Georgia to be allowed into Nato".
A less belligerent and more competent administration could have spared itself and Georgia the high cost of reckless adventures.
Adel Safty is Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Siberian Academy of Public Administration, Novosibirsk, Russia. His latest book, Leadership and Democracy, is published in New York.
