On May 10, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) or Myanmar's ruling military junta, will hold a referendum to adopt a Constitution for the country. However, a cyclone that battered five regions in lower Myanmar, may conceivably have forced the senior regime leaders to put constitutional matters off until after the clean up.
For nearly a month, both the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) regime and the opposition have been mobilising their respective supporters, attempting to deliver the other side a devastating blow. Unfortunately, Cyclone Nargis grabbed the headlines.
Even in the 21st century, the Burmese, [Myanmarese] whether Western-educated or not, view nature-induced disasters as the direct outcome of the failures on the part of those who lord over them.
As questionable as it may sound, Cyclone Nargis is a Godsend for the "Vote No to the new constitution" opposition campaigners. While the United Nations Security Council and other geopolitical powers may not come to their aid, nature has indeed offered an unexpected political tail wind. For whatever the symbolic and cultural readings of natural disasters and catastrophes, the cyclone-induced material devastation will compound the worst food crisis afflicting Myanmar, a state of affairs that is likely to increase public ire against the regime.
According to the draft constitution, which the junta has clobbered together unilaterally, the military allots itself 25 per cent of the parliamentary seats in any future legislature. Whatever the likely political outcomes for the junta's constitutional referendum, three possible scenarios can be portended.
The first scenario would be something like this: Taking the cue from the imprisoned opposition icon Aung San Suu Kyi, specifically her widely reported support for a "No" vote, the public will reject the military regime's draft constitution - regardless whether the upcoming referendum goes ahead as scheduled or is put off until a later date. In tandem, the SPDC regime chooses not to tamper with the vote counting and announces the results promptly and truthfully. Uncharacteristically, the regime thereafter embarks on a genuine process of dialogue and reconciliation with the mainstream political opposition, as well as with the active armed resistance groups.
Perestroika
Emboldened by the perestroika, the exiles and the NLD demand not only the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, but asks to strike out the clause which prohibits her - on grounds of her past marriage to a foreign citizen - from holding the highest office in the land, a position which Western governments echo. Myanmar's Asian neighbours such as China, India, Thailand, as well as Japan and Association of South East Asian Nations commend the regime's significant shift while stepping up security and economic cooperation.
The second, and more likely scenario is as follows: the disaster-struck public deal the SPDC regime a psychological blow with a thunderous "No". Frustrated and angry - and more importantly, not prepared to repeat the mistake of announcing the elections results in 1990 truthfully, the regime's senior leadership decided to rig the referendum results this time around by simply announcing that the Constitution has been voted overwhelmingly by the voters who desired the emergence of a national Constitution as a new basis of politics for 'modern, prosperous and discipline-flourishing democracy'. The Constitution is therefore to be adopted officially in accord with 'the people's desire'. It becomes effective during the first day of the next Parliament, convened following the multiparty elections in 2010. Meanwhile, the military leadership, the SPDC announces, will continue to discharge its honourable duties accorded by the country's historical circumstances in a non-partisan way.
As to be expected, the opposition screams foul, prompting US, UK, and France to scramble a new UN Security Council Presidential statement calling for the vote. China and Russia call the latest Western position out of synchrony with the UN Charter. Deaf to the Opposition's claims of voting irregularities and fraud, and rejecting the calls from Washington and London to exert pressure on the generals on grounds of 'non-interference' in a sovereign state, Myanmar's neighbours applaud the regime's successful completion of the Constitutional referendum and urges the generals in Nay Pyi Taw to stick to the timetable for the Roadmap for Democracy.
The third and least likely scenario would involve the public voting 'Yes'. Elated, the regime's senior leadership feels vindicated about their faith in the popularity of their 'Roadmap for Democracy' and other nation-building efforts. Western governments and the opposition maintain its long-standing policies of rejecting the SPDC Constitution and the military-controlled political process. Meanwhile, despite its irrelevance to the regime's political decisions, Asean rallies behind Indonesia's efforts to get the regime to appoint Aung San Suu Kyi honorary patron. Failing that, Indonesian mediators simply aim for the dissident's release into permanent exile in England. Jakarta's effort is solidly backed by Thailand's TV-cook-turned-prime-minister, as well as other more serious leaders in the region, who share the junta's view that she needs to be 'kicked upstairs', unfit to operate in the rough and tumble realpolitik of the real world.
Some Myanmar observers have remarked that trying to understand Burmese politics is like tealeaf reading or crystal ball gazing. But uncertainty and unpredictability concerning Myanmar politics and economy is often overstated. Whatever the referendum results, the fundamental building blocks of politics and power, as well as larger geo-economic and strategic equations surrounding Myanmar are least likely to be affected.
Maung Zarni is a Visiting Research Fellow (2006-9) at the Department of International Development (Queen Elizabeth House), University of Oxford. He was the founder of the Free Burma Coalition.
